























































Privacy, confidentiality and 
practicalities in data linkage 
 
 
Professor Kerina Jones 
Swansea University 
  




A contributing article to the National Statistician’s Quality Review 






1. Focus ................................................................................................................... 3 
2. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 Basic principles ................................................................................................. 3 
2.2 Legislative and regulatory backdrop .................................................................. 5 
3. Data linkage methods .......................................................................................... 6 
3.1 Data linkage steps ............................................................................................. 6 
3.2 Deterministic record linkage .............................................................................. 6 
3.3 Probabilistic record linkage ............................................................................... 7 
3.4 Privacy-preserving record linkage ..................................................................... 7 
3.5 Computer science approaches .......................................................................... 9 
3.6 Successive data linkage .................................................................................. 10 
4. Evaluating data linkage efficacy ......................................................................... 11 
5. Linkage methods in practice .............................................................................. 12 
5.1 Australian Federal and State-level Linkage ..................................................... 13 
5.2 Population Data BC, Canada .......................................................................... 13 
5.3 Secure Anonymised Information Linkage Databank, Wales ............................ 14 
5.4 Unpacking data linkage at SAIL ...................................................................... 14 
6. Discussion .......................................................................................................... 16 
6.1 Privacy-by-design case study .......................................................................... 17 
6.2 Selecting a data linkage approach .................................................................. 19 
7. Recommendations and options .......................................................................... 22 
8. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 25 





















This article explores data linkage methodologies with particular focus on privacy and 
confidentiality. These two terms are often used interchangeably, but for clarification: 
privacy refers to a person’s freedom from intrusion in their activities or information; 
confidentiality relates to information where there is an expectation that it will be held in 
confidence and not divulged without authorisation. The article introduces terminologies 
and concepts used in data linkage, and the main types of data linkage method in 
practical use. It briefly outlines the UK legislative and regulatory backdrop to 
emphasise the importance of privacy and confidentiality in context. Having outlined 
linkage methods, it discusses practicalities and the respective measures to evaluate 
linkage efficacy. From this, linkage methods in practice are illustrated via a selection 
of case studies. The choice of data linkage approach cannot be made in isolation, and 
so the material is drawn together and contextualised to propose a set of high-level 
questions and options to inform decision-making. Finally, it emphasises the importance 
of privacy and confidentiality in data linkage, and recommends a robust, proportionate, 
data governance framework with privacy by design to enable both the safe and 
optimum use of data.  
 
Data linkage is a large subject and, naturally, this article can only cover a limited scope. 
Further information is provided in an annotated bibliography. 
2. Introduction 
2.1 Basic principles 
Data linkage is defined as the processes involved in connecting records that relate to 
the same person, family, event, organisation or location (i.e. entities) within or between 
datasets. The term may also be referred to as entity resolution, de-duplication or record 
linkage. Within datasets it is used to clean the data by removing duplicate records and 
verify entity identities, and between datasets it enables data integration for combined 
analysis [1]. Methods of combining datasets that do not bring together specific entities 
(such as overlaying area-based deprivation indices and pollution levels) are outside 
the scope of this article. The growing availability of administrative datasets, and 
emerging data types in the increasingly connected digital world, is leading to vast 
expansions in data linkage across all sectors.  
 
The process relies on the presence of linkage variables i.e. data items that are present 
in both records of interest, and it is successful when these variables match in a record 
pair. However, there are various methodologies for determining whether two records 
form an acceptable match, with the main categories being deterministic or probabilistic 
linkage. In seeking to link individual-level data, both of these rely on the use of person 
identifiable data (PID). As such, privacy and confidentiality are of utmost importance, 
but they are significant factors whatever and however entities are being linked [1, 2]. 
In an ideal situation, each entity represented in the dataset would have a consistent, 
unique identifier(s) on which to base the linkage, so that all true matches and all false 
matches would be designated as such, but data linkage is not that simple because 
administrative datasets are not perfect. Consequently, there is a trade-off across four 







Match status Actual Assigned 
True positive Match Match 
False positive Non-match Match 
True negative Non-match Non-match 
False negative Match Non-match 
 
 
Deterministic record linkage (DRL) is based on classification rules to determine 
whether pairs of records are links or non-links. Within DRL, exact matching requires all 
linkage variables to be identical. But more generally, DRL allows for some degree of 
variation provided that the match is still definitive i.e. based on set rules and with no 
alternative competing record pair. DRL is most suitable in highly discriminative 
datasets with unique identifiers and/or high concordance between linkage variables. 
But, because of its high specificity, it can result in a high rate of missed matches (false 
negatives).  
 
Probabilistic record linkage (PRL) is based on assigning match weights to variables of 
interest to represent the likelihood that a record pair is a true match, given the degree 
of agreement between the variables, and an agreed threshold for classifying the link 
as true or false. PRL is traditionally supported with clerical review to set the thresholds 
for classifying matches/non-matches. Sometimes a grey area is set aside for manual 
decision making to limit the rate of incorrectly assigned matches. Depending how the 
weights and thresholds are set, the resulting sensitivity of PRL can tend towards a high 
rate of incorrectly assigned matches (false positives) [1, 2]. 
 
However, the distinction between DRL and PRL is not dichotomous, and both have 
many valid applications providing they are tuned appropriately. Both are able to 
accommodate uncertainty and partial agreement between record pairs, and there is 
always a trade-off between false positives and false negatives [3]. Often an optimised 
strategy is used in practice to combine both DRL and PRL techniques. 
 
In addition to PID-based linkage, there are also methods that do not rely on using 
identifiable data for record comparison. Privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) 
refers to data linkage using hash-encoded PID, with or without other variables of 
interest, to create linked record pairs. As a general principle, the PID is subjected to a 
one-way cryptographic hash-function, converting it to a string of data points such as a 
combination of 1s and 0s, with positional and frequency variations distinguishing one 
string of encrypted PID from another, and acting as the basis for record linkage. 
However, PPRL methods are not as long-established as DRL and PRL and are the 
subject of on-going research endeavours [4]. 
 
The choice of data linkage method will depend on various factors. But also, in setting 
out to link administrative datasets, it must be remembered that the data were generally 
not collected with linkage in mind. As such, the presence of a common, unique, cross-
dataset, entity identifier is the exception rather than the norm in the UK. For example, 
healthcare records have an NHS number, employment data have an NI number, and 
school records have a pupil number. These numbers are not indexed for cross-
comparison. Furthermore, there is often no accessible ground truth, or ‘gold standard’ 
listing against which to resolve identities definitively. As well as this, administrative data 
have other inherent challenges, including, missing records, missing variables, and 




2.2 Legislative and regulatory backdrop 
Within the UK, the main data protection legislation is the Data Protection Act (2018) [6] 
enacting the EU General Data Protection Regulation (2016) [7]. There is a basic 
requirement that the processing of general personal data must be able to rely on a 
lawful provision, set out in Article 6 of the GDPR, and special category data on the 
provisions of Article 9. Personal data are defined in Article 4 as ‘any information relating 
to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural 
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.’ Special category data are 
those revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade union membership, health, sex life or sexual orientation, and the use of 
genetic data and biometric data to uniquely identifying a natural person.  
 
Data that have been anonymised, such that an individual is no longer identifiable, fall 
outside data protection law. However, the GDPR includes a definition of 
pseudonymisation, and this refers to processing data in such a way that ‘the personal 
data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional 
information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject 
to technical and organisational measures.’ For these reasons, and the fundamental 
ethic of respecting individual privacy, the provisions of data protection legislation are 
highly relevant to data linkage processes.  
 
There are various established data linkage enterprises in the UK that make use of 
administrative data for research and evaluation. In general, datasets are used in 
anonymised format, subject to a suite of controls applied to both the data and the data 
environment. Data linkage is most usually carried out using PID, before the 
anonymization processes take place., but sometimes data providers require 
anonymization prior to linkage. For datasets derived from healthcare records, the use 
of an NHS-based trusted third party between the data provider and the data linkage 
enterprise can address the issues of using PID for data linkage. We will discuss this in 
more detail in Section 5.4. The Digital Economy Act (2017) [8] excludes health and 
social care data but makes provision for data sharing from non-health sources for 
research. Importantly, the provisions of the Digital Economy Act, specifically chapter 5 
(64), can be relied upon for matching and linking such administrative data, in addition 
to those of the GDPR and DPA. These and other pieces of legislation may apply to the 
primary collection of identifiable data, but as we are making the assumption that 
administrative data are extant we consider this out of scope.  
 
As well as general legislation, the provisions of the UK Statistics and Registration 
Service Act (2007) [9] and the Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR) Code of Practice 
for Statistics (2018) [10] are of particular relevance for work producing official statistics 
from administrative data. The Code is founded on three pillars: trustworthiness, quality 
and value, for confidence in producing data, assuring data and supporting society’s 
information needs. However, the USKA/OSR Quality Assurance of Administrative Data 
(QAAD) toolkit is used more specifically to assess administrative data use. Data 
linkage is an invaluable tool to maximise the potential of currently standalone datasets 
provided that this can be accomplished within the bounds of proper data governance 




will vary with many factors, but will include the legislative position as to whether PID 
can lawfully be processed for this purpose. 
3. Data linkage methods 
3.1 Data linkage steps 
There is a series of generic steps in record-to-record data linkage [11]. Privacy and 
confidentiality are essential considerations at all stages, because PID are required for 
at least some stages in all methods, and resulting linked datasets are not immune to 
disclosure risks.  
 
i) Pre-processing is necessary for assurance that both datasets are in a 
compatible format. This relies essentially on the use of PID. 
ii) Indexing/Blocking are used to reduce the number of record pairs compared, by 
specifying that potential matches must agree on certain criteria, thereby 
reducing the complexity of the matching process. This requires knowledge of 
the data characteristics [12]. 
iii) Record pair comparisons generate potential matches, based either on 
comparisons of PID or hashed functions. 
iv) Classification involves assigning matches, non-matches and potential matches. 
This is best performed against a gold standard and may involve clerical review. 
v) Evaluation of the quality and completeness of the matched dataset provides an 
assessment of process efficacy. 
3.2 Deterministic record linkage 
In many ways, DRL using PID is the most straightforward method of record linkage, 
particularly exact linkage. Whatever linkage variables are chosen, such as NHS 
number, first name, surname, date of birth, etc., a true match is assigned when the 
variables are identical in a pair of records. It does not have to rely on complex 
mathematical processes, but simply on whether or not two records are identical. If they 
are not identical, the record pair is a non-match. It is easy to see why exact matching 
has high specificity (resulting in a low rate of false positives), but also that it has low 
sensitivity (resulting in a high rate of false negatives). The advantages of exact 
matching are when datasets to be linked are of reliable quality and both contain highly 
discriminatory variables such as an NHS number. 
 
Beyond exact matching, DRL methods allow for degrees of variability in the linkage 
variables and these are embodied in a succession of decision rules. For example, 
following exact matching, comparisons of unmatched records may allow record pairing 
where all variables agree except one, or the rules may be set to allow more complex 
variability. In practice, for most administrative datasets with their many inherent 
imperfections, multiple decision rules will be required and the process becomes non-
trivial. Decisions need to be made on the hierarchy to assign to the rules, so they can 
be applied sequentially, beginning with the most specific and moving towards more 
flexibility. This is sometimes a subjective process, as well as depending on the linkage 
variables available and their relative discriminatory power. The resulting record 
matches are assigned a match rank to express the likelihood that they represent a true 
match. At the start, specificity will be high and sensitivity low, moving to vice versa as 




between false negatives and false positives will depend on the requirements for the 
linked dataset produced.  
3.3 Probabilistic record linkage 
PRL, like DRL, relies on the use of PID for the data linkage process. The idea that PRL 
is probabilistic and DRL is not, is somewhat of a misconception since both include 
likelihood and uncertainty [3]. In PRL, variables are assigned a weighting based on 
their discriminatory power and statistical theory is used to determine if a set of linkage 
variables constitute a true match. Basically, two sets of probabilities are produced: m 
represents the probability that a variable agrees on two data sources, given the pair 
are a true match; u represents the probability that the variable agrees on both data 
sources given the pair are NOT a true match. So, the m-probability is a measure of 
data quality and the u-probability measures the distinguishing power of that variable. 
These are used to assign a match weight to the pair to create a score representing 
their likelihood of being a true match [13]. The decision of whether to accept a given 
score as a true match is based on setting thresholds (and often clerical review) which 
in turn depends on the planned applications of the product dataset, as for DRL. 
 
In practice, there is no reason to use DRL or PRL in isolation. Algorithms using 
combinations of DRL and PRL can be used by means of successive matching runs. 
Successive match runs can be very effective in large scale linkage exercises where 
DRL is efficient at linking the majority of straightforward cases. This allows the greater 
computational demands of PRL to be reserved for linking more challenging residual 
cases. In an ideal situation, whatever linkage regime is used, it would be evaluated 
against a gold standard dataset of verified identities, and dataset purpose based on 
whether the optimum for the use case is to maximise specificity or sensitivity.  
Measures to evaluate linkage methods are discussed in Section 4. 
3.4 Privacy-preserving record linkage 
The key point about privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) is that it doesn’t rely on 
PID for the data linkage process beyond the pre-processing stage. Instead, it uses 
cryptographically hashed bit strings of the linkage variables, but it does, of course, 
require PID to produce the strings [14]. There are many PPRL methods, but few have 
been operationally evaluated for use with real-world administrative data [15]. A 
thorough examination of PPRL is beyond the scope of this article but the general 
principles are illustrated via the Bloom filters method [16]. 
 
A Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure that can be used in similarity comparisons 
for record linkage. They are bit vectors consisting of a series of 1s and 0s, with all 
positions initially set to zero until the hash function is applied to a given variable. An 







Figure 1: An example of Bloom filters from the names Smith and Smyth for 
string comparison1. 
 
The variables of interest, in this case the names Smith and Smyth, are split up into q-
grams (in this case bigrams: _S, SM, etc.) and the hash function determines the 
positions of the 1s. It can be seen that where the bigrams are identical between Smith 
and Smyth, 1s are generated in the same positions, and where they differ (e.g. 
between MI and MY) they result in differing placements. Hash functions are one-way 
i.e. once they are applied, they cannot be used in reverse to return to the PID used to 
create them. 
 
The likelihood of a match is based on the similarity between the strings, with one 
method of assessing this being the Dice coefficient. The use of such coefficients is not 
exclusive to PPRL, and can be used to improve linkage in PRL by incorporating partial 
agreement on linkage variables:     
                          
 






Where, h is the number of shared bigrams, and |a|, |b| is the number of bigrams in the 
strings a and b. Other variables of interest can be used, including numerical values 
such as date of birth, and variables can be concatenated to create cryptographic long-
term keys (CLKs). The resulting similarity value is based directly on the extent to which 
the positions of the 1s match exactly. But the assessment is more sophisticated with 
the addition of more flexible measures of comparison and expectation, which are 
beyond the scope of this article. Generally, there’s a trade off with different types of 
encryption. Those that retain intelligence to enable comparison of string similarity (as 
with Bloom filters) are often criticised as being vulnerable to cryptographic attacks. 
Those that do not retain intelligence for string comparison (e.g. Secure Hashing 
Algorithms) offer more protection, but less utility to maximise linkage quality. 
 
Despite the fact that PPRL does not rely on PID once it comes to the record linkage 
process, the process and the resulting dataset are not immune to privacy and 
confidentiality risks. PID are still used to create the hashed strings and, even if all (or 
                                                          




the majority of) possible quasi-identifiers are encrypted, linked datasets are still subject 
to disclosure risks [17, 18]. It may not be practical or desirable to go to the length that 
all attributes be encrypted, and controls beyond those applied directly to the data need 
to come into play to maintain data utility. 
3.5 Computer science approaches 
In recent years there have been major developments in what can be grouped into 
computer science approaches, made possible as a result of more accessible and 
larger compute capacity. These are based on data mining or machine learning 
techniques, and can be supervised or unsupervised. Supervised learning requires 
training data to verify true matches, whereas unsupervised learning does not. Both 
may use clustering or graph-based approaches to classify record matches.  
 
These differ from ‘traditional’ methods in that they don’t rely on classifying pairs of 
records individually but on clusters of similar records. But there are some major hurdles 
to overcome. For example, good training data with known true matches and non-
matches are rarely available in practice and may have to be generated. This can be 
costly, risky for data quality and burdensome in terms of work effort. Active learning 
processes, or semi-supervised learning, aim to overcome this problem by selecting 
samples of record pairs to be classified manually. The method is then iteratively trained 
and improved based on the manually labelled data. Unsupervised models operate a 
step further, without training data or labelled data [19].  
 
Graph-based data linkage and management approaches are gaining momentum in 
some quarters but are still subject to much research. These methods are based on 
relationships between groups of records, rather than individual pairs. Basically, rather 
than store the data in relational databases, which might not adequately capture the 
underlying nature of the data, they are stored in a graph database, having a network 
of nodes (records) connected by edges (comparisons). This structure is purported to 
better capture the relationships between data elements. As such, it is not a linkage 
approach per se but is a management approach to enable novel linkage approaches.  
 
The typical end to end workflow for the graph approach is as follows: 
• Data cleaning 
• Adding data to system and assigning identity 
• Calculating deterministic links and adding equivalence links to database 
• Performing self-linkage and adding de-duplication layer to database 
• Performing cross-linkage and adding cross-linkage layer to database 
• Identifying thresholds 
• Identifying clusters containing non-reviewed edges within thresholds 
• Reviewing/resolving these clusters 
• Extracting resulting clusters 
• Assigning cluster identity and generating change reports 
• Returning information to client  
 
However, a graph-based approach may also result in there being no explicit cluster 
identity because the cluster created depends on the thresholds applied. For this 
reason, some see the use of graph databases as a departure from traditional thinking 
in terms of a master list or definitive record identity, to one where the notion of ‘truth’ is 
somewhat ‘relaxed’. None the less, graph-based approaches are proposed to have 




confidentiality issues need to be properly taken into account as for any data 
management and linkage approach. 
3.6 Successive data linkage 
So far, we have considered linkage of two datasets by record-to-record comparison2. 
But in practice, there will often be a need to link more than two datasets to produce 
data for research.  An ideal way of ensuring consistent successive record linkage is by 
creating and retaining a unique linking key for each individual (or other entity) 
represented in the dataset. However, this might not always be possible. While there 
are other ways to approach this issue, they may incur difficulties in assigning dataset 
precedence and may lead to greater numbers of records remaining unmatched (false 
negatives). For example, when dataset A is linked to dataset B producing dataset C, 
data imperfections and linkage trade-offs, will mean potential matches are left behind. 
When attempting to link a successive dataset to dataset C, depending where datasets 
A and B reside, it might not be possible to go back and conduct the new linkage on the 
full sets of records, but only on dataset C. This will result in the loss of potential matches 
for further successive linkage, as was the case in linking A and B, and so on.  
Depending on the method used in successive linkage, there can be considerable 
issues with transitive closure, especially if not all PID variables agree exactly for all 
records relating to a single entity. Transitive closure relates to the concept of 
reachability between data nodes. For example, for records, a1, a2 and a3, independent 
match decisions can lead to contradictions as follows: a1 and a2 are designated a 
match, a1 and a3 are designated a match, but a2 and a3 are designated a non-match 
[22]. As a result of issues such as this, linkage optimisation in succession is still the 
focus of on-going research. The problem can be avoided if a linkage key, unique to 
each individual represented in the dataset, can be retained. 
Data linkage enterprises might not be authorised to hold identifiable data in order to 
create a linking key. In such cases they may use a trusted third party (TTP) to carry 
out the matching process and to remove the PID. Alternatively, this may be done by 
the original data controller. This process (ideally) verifies the identities in a dataset of 
interest against a gold standard reference dataset (where this exists). It then replaces 
the PID with a linkage key, unique to each individual represented in the dataset. The 
anonymous key can be used to link any number of datasets rendered devoid of their 
PID. This principle will be illustrated using a working example in Section 5.4.  
 
As noted above, any datasets prepared by record linkage might still risk privacy and 
confidentiality disclosures, even if they are ostensibly anonymous. This does not rely 
on reversing the process of PID removal; it depends on piecing information together 
from ‘quasi-identifiers’. There are various terms for attacks on such datasets, with 
common ones being ‘jigsaw’, ‘attribute re-identification’ and ‘implicit linkage’. It may be 
attempted from the linked dataset alone or in combination with external pieces of 
information in the attacker’s possession or awareness. There is a whole realm, 
sometimes referred to as ‘re-identification science’ [23], dedicated to developing and 
testing linkage attacks with a view to minimising residual risk. This is particularly 
challenging if the means available to highly motivated intruders are taken into account, 
such that some view the creation of a totally anonymous, useful dataset as impossible. 
                                                          
2 As well as record-to-record approaches, there are also clustering and graph-based methods to 




Crucially, controls on the data environment are highly relevant, not solely those applied 
to the data. 
 
Some organisations choose to use synthetic datasets, since they may be acceptable 
for certain purposes requiring broad trends by retaining the distributions of key 
variables. Synthetic data may be created de novo or derived from extant data. In either 
case, data linkage can still be applied to synthetic data provided that the datasets 
contain one or (preferably) more variables in common, with sufficient reliability and 
discriminatory power to be used for linkage. Again, a consistent unique key would be 
ideal.  
4. Evaluating data linkage efficacy 
The usual measures to assess linkage efficacy are precision and recall. Precision is 
similar to positive predictive value and is defined as the number of true matching pairs 
(True Positives (TP)) divided by the total number of pairs designated as matching (TP 
plus False Positives (FP)): 
 
Precision =  
𝑇𝑃




Recall, also known as sensitivity, is calculated by dividing TP by the number of all true 
matching pairs (TP plus False Negatives (FN)): 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =  
𝑇𝑃




The estimation of precision and recall requires a ground truth, or gold standard, for 
comparison. Alternatively, it can be established through clerical review of stratified 
samples of matches & pairs classified as non-matches. They are augmented by other 
measures such as the harmonic mean between precision and recall, which is known 
as the F-measure [24, 25]. The F-measure can be useful in combination with other 
measures, but caution has been recommended since the F-measure can also be 
expressed as a weighted arithmetic mean of precision and recall, with weights which 
depend on the linkage method being used. This reformulation reveals that the F-
measure has a major conceptual weakness since it depends on the relative importance 
given to precision and recall, and means that different linkage methods are being 
evaluated using different measures. In effect, the measure being used to evaluate 
match performance depends on the mechanism being evaluated [26]. 
 
For DRL and PRL which rely the use of PID for data linkage, we take for granted here 
that identifiable data must only be processed in accordance with data protection 
legislation and regulations, and with data provider permissions for appropriate data 
handling to ensure privacy and confidentiality. This must be the case whether data 
processing is carried out at source, by a TTP, or by a data linkage enterprise. Whatever 
technique is used, PID must be surrounded by a suitable regime of controls and 
safeguards to prevent data breaches and misuse, as for working with personal data for 
any purpose. 
At first glance, it could be thought that the use of PPRL techniques which de-identify 




case, as alluded to above. PPRL techniques are designed to mitigate the risks 
associated with the use of PID in the record linkage stages. But even with PPRL and 
federated linkage, once linked datasets are produced which have quasi-identifiers and 
a breadth of granular data variables, it can be relatively straightforward to re-identify at 
least some of the data subjects. When thought of in this way, the value afforded by 
PPRL is limited, since the extra protection it provides initially does not carry through to 
linked data usage.   
Consequently, PPRL techniques are evaluated via a combination of scalability, linkage 
quality and privacy [17, 24]. Scalability relates to process efficiency and compute 
demand, since this can be particularly high when using PPRL. Linkage quality is the 
measure of linkage precision (similar to positive predictive value) and recall 
(sensitivity). Privacy in this context is a measure of security risk of disclosure of PID 
during the process. Overall performance refinements are made as a trade-off between 
these three factors depending on use requirements and risk appetite. 
 
Using our example of Bloom filters for PPRL, the main types of disclosure attack that 
can be made are: 
• Dictionary attack: If an attacker knows the hash function, they can encrypt a 
large set of quasi-identifiers until matching masked values are found. 
• Frequency attack: If a relevant set of population quasi-identifiers is known, 
frequency distributions can then be analysed to determine likely corresponding 
q-gram mappings (even without knowing the hash function).  
• Cryptanalysis attack: This can occur where patterns in bit distributions allow an 
adversary to learn the characteristics of hash functions that are used (e.g. for 
common names) to map record values into a Bloom filter. 
• Composition attack: With auxiliary information (background knowledge) about 
the individual datasets and/or certain records in the datasets, a composition 
attack can be successful by using the information in combination to learn 
sensitive values of certain records.  
• Collusion: Where a TTP is used for data linkage, there is scope for collusion 
between one data provider and the TTP to uncover information on the other 
database owner’s data. 
 
It must be noted, however, that these attacks would require effort and motivated action. 
They would not occur through poor data governance practice where data are 
accidentally released or naively misused, as could be the case with PID-based data 
linkage unless a robust suite of controls is in place. Even so, there have been 
successful attacks and further developments (and work continues) to harden PPRL 
methods to enhance their security.  But it should always be borne in mind that 
disclosure risk is unlikely to ever be totally eradicated. 
5. Linkage methods in practice 
Among the existing data linkage enterprises, there is a variety of data linkage and 
operational models. We set out illustrations from Australia, Canada and the UK to show 
how data linkage works in practice. We have not attempted to be exhaustive, but have 
chosen a variety of models as illustrations3. 
 
                                                          




5.1 Australian Federal and State-level Linkage 
Australia has a long history of data linkage enterprise, beginning in the 1970s. The 
Population Health Research Network (PHRN) and its Centre for Data Linkage (CDL) 
were established in 2009 to provide researchers with access to an array of state and 
federal health and non-health administrative datasets [27]. Linkage of federal-level 
(‘national’) datasets is carried out by the CDL, whereas state-level linkage is conducted 
by data linkage units within the specific jurisdictions.  
 
There is no centralised data repository at the CDL and data providers only release data 
on a project-by-project basis. The CDL uses demographic data to create and hold an 
index of linkage keys but does not hold content data (clinical details, events, etc.). CDL 
uses PRL without a gold standard reference dataset to create the index of keys. 
Similarly, state-level linkage units such as the Centre for Health Record Linkage 
(CHeReL), which operates in the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales, 
maintain state-level indices of links. CHeReL uses a combination of DRL and PRL 
methods building on well-established methods in several Australian states [28]. Data 
providers send approved de-identified datasets to researchers, and the CDL provides 
them with project-specific keys to enable linkage and simultaneously disenable 
collusion and linkage to other datasets that may be held as part of another project. In 
contrast to the CDL, state-level units may also hold de-identified versions of complete 
datasets and enable access to them for research4. Where this occurs, there is a strict 
separation between the linkage and research functions.  
 
State-level units also use differing data linkage approaches: for example, the Western 
Australia Data Linkage Branch (WADLB) is moving to a cluster-based data linkage 
system [29, 30]. This new system is referred to as DLS3 (Data Linkage System 3) and 
has been designed in-house to replace the legacy linkage system which used 
proprietary file-based linkage software (FLS). DLS3 has been designed to overcome 
the limitations in the FLS that became evident as the scope of data linkage in the 
WADLB grew. For example, the FLS did not retain information about matching 
decisions, it was limited to a set order, it required onerous clerical review, and it could 
not concurrently consider more than two records for potential matching. DLS3 is being 
implemented using a phased replacement of the legacy system to maintain 
compatibility in the interim [30]. 
5.2 Population Data BC, Canada 
Population Data BC (PopData) operates data linkage and holds a repository with a 
breadth of administrative data in British Columbia [31, 32]. PopData is authorised to 
hold identifiable datasets and to function as a TTP in carrying out data matching and 
linkage in order to provide access to de-identified data within a secure research 
environment (SRE). It does not have a research programme of its own, but enables 
research by other parties subject to approvals. PopData operates within a strictly-
controlled, high-security environment with zones to enact separation principles and to 
control access. Data linkage is performed using a combination of DRL and PRL 
techniques. Linkage keys are transformed into project-level identifiers to preclude 
linkage to other datasets. 
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Researchers access their approved linked datasets within the SRE. This takes place 
via a fire-walled virtual private network (VPN) with two-factor authentication of data 
users using a Yubi-Key. Researchers are prevented from downloading identifiable or 
row-level data. Instead, information for intended release is managed via a transfer 
programme to enable PopData to keep an audit trail. 
5.3 Secure Anonymised Information Linkage Databank, Wales 
The Secure Anonymised Information Linkage Databank (SAIL) was established in 
2007 as a repository of linkable de-identified datasets to be made available for 
research in anonymised form [33]. SAIL holds many health and non-health 
administrative datasets such as: GP, hospital (in-patient and out-patient), screening 
services, ONS births and deaths, education, housing, and fire & rescue services 
datasets. SAIL does not handle PID, but makes use of a TTP that carries out the 
matching process and the creation of a unique, consistent identifier for each person 
represented in the data. Linkage includes both DRL and PRL techniques in sequence, 
beginning with exact matching. A strict separation principle is operated where a data 
provider divides their data into two components: demographic and payload/content. 
The demographic data are sent to the TTP and the content data to SAIL. 
Recombination of de-identified datasets is made at SAIL and the unique key allows 
linkage across datasets. 
 
SAIL enables data access within a SRE subject to approvals and a suite of technical, 
physical and procedural controls, including two-factor authentication of data users 
using a Yubi-Key, and a fire-walled virtual private network (VPN). Researchers cannot 
remove or alter the underlying data and requests to export analysis products are 
scrutinised and managed by a data guardian.  
5.4 Unpacking data linkage at SAIL 
The data linkage process in place for SAIL (for both health and non-health 
administrative data) begins with a fully identifiable dataset at the data provider setting. 
Having divided the data into demographic and content, the provider sends the 
demographic data to the TTP and the content data to SAIL. This strictly applied 
separation principle is key to ensuring privacy and confidentiality in the data linkage 
process, since it is based on PID. 
 
The TTP in this case is the NHS Wales Informatics Service (NWIS): a national 
organisation providing statistics and IT solutions to the NHS in Wales. The TTP uses 
the NHS number (where present), plus first name, surname, date of birth, gender and 
postcode, as the linkage variables. Since the datasets can be large, blocking is used 
to reduce matching complexity. Beginning with exact matching and progressing to 
other DRL and PRL techniques, it matches the demographic data against an 
administrative register referred to as the Welsh Demographic Service (WDS.) The 
WDS acts as the gold standard since it is a maintained database of everyone in Wales 
who has engaged with the NHS, and therefore approximates a demographic database.  
 
If an exact match is not found, the algorithm progresses to techniques such as 
Soundex and lexicon matching. Soundexing relies on converting a variable (such as 
surname) to a short sequence e.g. J520, S530, based on the first letter and the 
consonants present in the name. In this way it allows variability and matching based 




Soundex code. Lexicon matching allows for variations in names via the use of 
diminutives, such as Robert to Bobby or Bob. The rules and thresholds have been 
optimised for use with health and non-health administrative data arising from Wales. 
However, it is worth noting that Soundexing and Lexicon matching can be less reliable 
and do not perform as well on non-Anglo Saxon names. They would need to be 
optimised for the population of study. 
 
Each match is assigned a probability, and these are based on likelihood ratios 
calculated using a Bayesian approach of prior and posterior odds.  
 
The posterior odds are calculated as: Posterior odds = prior odds x likelihood ratio 
 
The likelihood ratios are calculated as follows: 
 
Firstly, where the demographic variables match (e.g. on surname), the agreement 
weight is given by:    
 
p(match|records relate to the same person) = m 
p(match|records relate to a different person) = u 
 
Agreement weight = m/u 
 
And where the demographic variables do not match, the disagreement weight is given 
by:   
 
p(non-match|records relate to the same person) = 1-m 
p(non-match|records relate to a different person) = 1-u 
 
Disagreement weight = (1-m)/(1-u) 
 
 
Generally, the likelihood ratio is calculated for each record pair in logarithms, more 
specifically log (base 2), as the sum of the logged agreement & disagreement weights. 
 
Assigning match probabilities enables decisions on the acceptable cut-off to be made 
depending on the use purpose, making the balance between high specificity or high 
sensitivity. Once matching is complete, the TTP replaces the PID with an identifier 
based on an encryption of the NHS number. This is referred to as the Anonymous 
Linking Field (ALF) and it is unique to each person. This is not limited to datasets 
arising from healthcare and can also be applied to those without NHS numbers. NWIS 
holds a record of NHS numbers in the WDS and by using the matching variables (first 
name, surname, date of birth, gender and postcode) can, therefore, assign an NHS 
number to records where it is absent [34].  
 
The ALFs and minimal demographic details (week of birth, gender and Lower Layer 
Super Output Area of residence) are sent to SAIL for recombination with the content 
data. This uses a simple record number maintained in both components when the data 
were divided by the provider. SAIL re-encrypts the ALF to ensure that no one at SAIL 
or the TTP can reverse the process leading to identities. The double encrypted ALF is 




required for research studies and the ALF can be further encrypted at project level as 
an additional safeguard. 
 
All the examples illustrated in this section use a persisted unique identifier for each 
person (or other entity) represented in a dataset. They all use, and have honed, their 
data linkage methods using a combination of DRL and PRL. In addition, the Australian 
CDL has carried out significant work on the development of PPRL methods based on 
Bloom filters [35, 36, 37]. Work is ongoing to operationalise them at the Australian 
CDL, in PopData and for use with SAIL. 
6. Discussion  
This article illustrates the principles of record linkage, and emphasises the importance 
of privacy and confidentiality at all stages of the process. It is important to note that 
some measures of disclosure risk are specific to data linkage, but the process needs 
to sit within an overarching data governance framework to protect the data, as for any 
work using person-based data. The data linkage process is not special in this respect. 
 
In accordance with statistical disclosure control (SDC) theory [17], if an individual can 
be re-identified, or if sufficient information can be derived to attribute personal 
information to an individual, there is a privacy risk. Risks may be classified as record-
level or attribute-level disclosure, and they are usually assessed by conducting attack 
tests and evaluations5. But as shown in the five safes framework, safety is a measure, 
not a hard-and-fast quantifiable state [41]. As we have strongly emphasised, there 
must be controls around the data as well as within the data, since there are limits to 
the measures that can be applied to data if their utility is to be retained. Many countries 
engage in large-scale linkage for population census assessment [42], and even when 
using privacy-preserving methods, risks have been uncovered leading to the 
recommendation for protection of the data, through a suite of physical, security and 
procedural controls upon the data environment [43].  
 
As well as the remaining privacy risks, PPRL techniques have been shown to limit the 
utility and quality of any resulting linked datasets. This is a significant issue and one 
which must inevitably be factored into choices of data linkage approach. A three-year 
study to inform the work of NHS Digital resulted in PPRL not being recommended for 
use above PID-based methods. This was largely because of the potential of currently 
available PPRL methods to undermine linkage accuracy and hence data utility. It was 
proposed that a more rational solution would be to avoid anonymisation at source, and 
to improve linkage accuracy by having regional and national trusted linkage 
environments with expertise in using sophisticated data linkage methods to improve 
and evaluate linkage accuracy [44].  
 
Another limiting factor that needs to be considered in PPRL is the burden that data 
pre-processing can place on the data provider: both in terms of effort and expertise. 
This can be onerous and challenging, but in some cases PPRL might be the only way 
providers will share their data. In such cases, a Catch-22 may apply, where the use of 
PPRL circumvents unwillingness to share data, but the burden precludes the process 
from actually taking place in a timely way, if at all. This is an issue that needs to be 
carefully navigated if it is to be pursued whilst endeavouring to respect privacy and 
                                                          





confidentiality. This will necessarily include the nature of the data provider, datasets 
and proposed data uses. 
 
As we have shown, applying more and more controls to the data will not fully address 
the problem of residual privacy risks. There is a wealth of research that shows that 
putatively anonymised datasets can be used to re-identify individuals [23], and it is 
unlikely that the privacy risk in any meaningful dataset can be zero. This is not a trivial 
problem, nor one that can be solved by ‘balancing’ privacy and utility, since these 
factors are not linearly related, but are more of a scatter, since they vary with use case 




Figure 2: Relating privacy and utility 
 
There comes a point where additional control measures do not add significant 
safeguards, but do reduce data value. This has been termed ‘privacy-protectionism’ 
[45]. It arises in the laudable effort to minimise risks, but what is needed is a recognition 
of the place of data controls as part of a data governance framework with privacy-by-
design. This is true of the data linkage process as well as when using the resulting 
linked data for research. 
6.1 Privacy-by-design case study 
The data linkage process in operation for SAIL was described in Section 5.4. Here we 
elaborate to show how this fits into a privacy-by-design data governance framework, 
with a particular focus on privacy and confidentiality [46]. We have chosen SAIL 
because it is a long-established UK example using multiple population-level datasets 
from health and non-health sources. From this, we will draw out a set of guiding 
principles to aid decision makers in selecting a data linkage approach. 
 
Many of the datasets that come to SAIL originate in operational IT systems, often in 
clinical settings. The status, type and level of inter-operability inherent in such systems 
varies widely, as it does for other administrative data sources. In considering how to 
approach data linkage, we needed to consider data provider readiness in terms of their 
compute capacity, the burden that would be imposed on them, and their due diligence 
processes to share data in line with data protection legislation and regulations.  
 
As we’ve noted, the quality of administrative data is inconsistent, with inaccuracies and 




verification. For this reason, and to avoid the complications that would be incurred if 
we needed to handle identifiable data at SAIL, we established a data linkage model 
using a TTP for identity verification, data matching and anonymisation. Secure data 
transfer protocols are made use of at all stages, in moving the demographic data to 
the TTP, the content data to SAIL, and the ALFs and minimal demographics to SAIL. 
 
The data matching method is based on PID and identifiable linkage variables. As such, 
privacy and confidentiality are assured by a combination of physical, technical and 
procedural controls as per the TTP data governance framework. By its essence, this 
is not a statistically quantifiable measure; it relies on industry standards and ultimately 
integrity in data processing. In the case of NWIS acting as a TTP, demographic data 
arising from the NHS is processed as a part of its core business in accordance with 
the EU GDPR and UK DPA. For administrative data from other sources, the provisions 
of the UK DEA allow data processing for matching and anonymisation by a TTP.  
 
SAIL is underpinned by an infrastructure referred to as the UK Secure Research 
Platform (UK SeRP). This forms the basis of the SRE via which data are made 
accessible for bona fide research purposes. UK SeRP is an ISO27001 approved 
independent technology and analysis platform. It can be configured via customisable 
specifications to allows multiple, complex datasets to be managed, analysed and 
shared in line with the data owners’ Information Governance framework, subject to 
legislative and regulatory requirements. Data users access UK SeRP remotely via an 
internet portal subject to permissions and approvals. The SRE for SAIL is referred to 
as the SAIL Gateway. UK SeRP can be made available for use by other organisations 
and can be augmented by the implementation of a National Research Data Appliance 
(NRDA) at data provider organisations. The NRDA is a set of modular data 
concentrator technologies, that includes automated matching, anonymisation, linkage, 
data management, metadata capture and data quality assessment based on 
developments at Curtin University, Australia. These technologies enable organisations 
who do not have their own data linkage and management infrastructures to share, link 
and use data in a secure environment6.  
 
SAIL does not rely solely on technical measures applied to the data or even within the 
SRE as a whole, but augments these with physical and procedural controls. We will 
not describe these in detail, other than to say that they include access-controlled zoned 
areas, and a set of agreements, policies and operating procedures, plus data user 
training and accreditation. All these measures are necessary simply because although 
SAIL does not handle identifiable data, there are still inherent risks to consider. In order 
to mitigate these, we have to go beyond measures applied to the data if utility for 
research is to be retained. The totality of privacy and confidentiality risk in a SRE such 
as this cannot be quantified as a coefficient. Instead the risk status of the system is 
measured by industry best practice and certification: SAIL itself is ISO 27001 certified. 
Taking into account the environment in which the data are managed, we operate in a 
position where totality of the data is functionally anonymised [38]. Where there is any 
doubt that such data could be considered de-identified but not fully anonymised, we 
rely on the provisions of the GDPR for the work of data management and preparation 
for research being in the public interest.  
 
Once the data arrive at SAIL, the ALF is subjected to a second level of encryption on 
a wholescale basis. This ensures that no one at SAIL or at the TTP can reverse the 
                                                          




anonymization algorithm to return to individual identities.  Further controls are applied 
at project level. These are determined based on the use case for the data, and the 
types of data, being requested. SAIL established an independent Information 
Governance Review Panel (IGRP) to advise on the suitability of data use proposals 
and their likely disclosure risks, over and above assessment by skilled SAIL analysts. 
The IGRP carries out a subjective assessment, based on experience. Members 
include data guardians of major datasets (such as hospital episodes), ethics 
professionals and members of the general public from a Consumer Panel to guide on 
social acceptability in data use7. Where risks are perceived, feedback is given to the 
researcher and, with guidance from a SAIL analyst, the proposal is modified to mitigate 
risks without adversely affecting data utility. This may involve applying record and 
attribute level control measures to the data. SAIL uses masking, suppression and 
aggregation, but does not use data perturbative methods.   
 
Following analysis within the SRE, the researcher needs to make a request to a SAIL 
data guardian in order for results to be released externally. This involves a process of 
manual scrutiny by the data guardian to ensure the products of analysis are appropriate 
for export and do not introduce risks to privacy and confidentiality. Row-level data are 
not allowed to leave the SRE, unless participant consent and all relevant permissions 
and regulatory approvals are in place. Instead, we release statistical coefficients, 
tables with no cell counts below a limit, charts, graphs and other summary measures.   
 
SAIL periodically carries out in-house internal audits, including testing security 
protocols and ensuring controls are of the highest standard across the system. This is 
in addition to being externally verified via ISO 27001. Since individuals with access to 
restricted data may choose to go beyond their contract and attempt to piece together 
information leading to uncovering identities, SAIL tracks queries written by 
researchers, can suspend data access and initiate penalties for data misuse. Security 
protocols can only go so far, and there is a point at which there has to be an element 
of trust. This is not a concept unique to working with administrative data in a SRE, but 
is common wherever researchers have access to meaningful data about people. But 
the need to rely on trust should always be minimised as far as possible. At the end of 
a research study, data prepared for the project are retained by SAIL, and they can, if 
necessary, be archived when the data provider and governance approval conditions 
do not permit re-use. 
 
Altogether, and from start to finish along the pathway from data provider to project 
completion, the suite of technical, physical and procedural controls in place at the SAIL 
databank comprise a privacy-by-design model to ensure privacy and confidentiality 
have paramount importance.  
6.2 Selecting a data linkage approach 
It is evident that the choice of data linkage approach cannot be made in isolation. It will 
depend on a number of inter-related factors which must be considered in combination, 
since the involvement of other parties and the nature of the data environment(s) are 
key to feasibility and, crucially, to privacy and confidentiality in data linkage [47]. 
 
Data provenance is an important consideration since it will dictate the type of linkage 
method that can be used. An essential first question is whether the PID are allowed to 
                                                          




move. If the answer appears to be no, then we need to find out the reasons why, and 
determine if this can be remedied. Sometimes this is a matter of due diligence within 
an organisation concerning internal policies, or it might be that there is genuinely no 
lawful provision. Some government data can move under the provisions of the DEA, 
other datasets are subject to the creation of (temporary) legal gateways for particular 
purposes, or further limitations.  
 
It will always be worth seeking to allow the PID to move since this opens up the 
opportunity to use a TTP for identity verification, matching and the creation of a 
consistent linkage key via PID-based methods. If it is not possible for the PID to move, 
it may be possible for the TTP functions to be carried out in-house, depending on 
feasibility and providing there can be agreement on an algorithm to create a shared 
key for onward linkage. This, however, is prone to risk and would require additional 
security measures, since at face value a common key would enable an organisation to 
uncover the identities in another organisation’s dataset. Where PID cannot move, the 
only option might be to use PPRL methods to anonymise at source.     
 
IT systems in administrative organisations are frequently under pressure, not 
compatible intra- or inter-organisationally, and often not at the cutting edge in compute 
capacity or performance. This situation, along with inconsistent and sometimes low 
data quality, will influence the choice of data linkage approach. The demand on the 
data provider can be minimal or significant. Considering the operational burdens 
incumbent on administrative services in general, as well as the lack of experience in 
data linkage, it would be wise to minimise their active role in the process wherever 
possible. This, and the likely insufficiencies in IT systems, would point preferentially 
towards transferring PID to a TTP for data linkage, rather than doing this in-house. Or 
it may be possible to implement a PPRL hashing function at the data provider, 
providing the pre-processing step can be accomplished and as long as the compute 
demand was limited. Even so, the next steps (blocking, classification, evaluation) 
would need to rely on a TTP in a three-party protocol. 
 
The nature of the datasets and the main intended use cases of linked data will influence 
the selection of linkage method. Data quality in terms of accuracy and completeness 
will need to be factored into the decision, taking into account the degrees of tolerance 
in data use. To some extent this is a balancing act on whether it is most important to 
have high specificity (and incur relatively more false negatives) or high sensitivity (and 
incur relatively more false positives). But it is only really an issue where data quality is 
poor, not where data quality is high or can be pre-processed via identity verification, 
effectually increasing the quality of the linkage variables. Again, this comes back to 
whether there is a gold standard dataset or if ground truth is accessible. In practice this 
issue is addressed by algorithms carrying out linkage steps in sequence, and providing 
measures of matched pair likelihood, albeit via single or combinations of DRL and 
PRL8.  
 
Intended data use cases may be well-defined or more variable, and the nature of the 
decisions to be made from the outputs is an important deciding factor on whether to 
lean towards specificity or sensitivity. For the majority of administrative data uses it is 
usually advantageous to prioritise the former for greater accuracy, but with reference 
to distributions across the dataset to avoid selection bias. 
                                                          
8 PPRL methods are not excluded here since DRL and PRL refer to linkage being deterministic or 





The available infrastructure for data linkage, management and access, along with the 
involvement of other parties will play a major role in determining which approaches can 
be used. In terms of other parties, we refer to the availability of a suitable TTP and 
other data providers being able to engage in data linkage and sharing. This will depend 
on legislation and accreditation as well as on due diligence processes to ensure privacy 
and confidentiality are respected. The use of a TTP is a valuable (sometimes 
invaluable) component in many data linkage methods. But there are alternatives. Some 
PID-based or PPRL mechanisms can be conducted without a TTP and are referred to 
as two-party protocols. The NRDA which operates as part of the UK SeRP includes 
identity verification and matching in the automated modular system by incorporating 
the gold standard dataset. But in effect, it is functioning as the TTP: a reliable 
go-between but without the involvement of a third-party organisation. As we have 
observed, some TTP functions can be carried out by data providers in-house, but 
privacy and confidentiality need to be considered carefully to avoid inappropriate 
disclosure to outside agencies.  
 
This leads us to the data environment itself and whether linked data are to be released 
externally to researchers or accessed within a managed SRE. We illustrated these 
options briefly via case studies (Section 5). In the former example, there is a 
requirement for a co-ordinating department or organisation to retain an index of linkage 
keys to enable linkage of datasets provided externally to researchers. In the latter, data 
are usually held in a central repository9 and accessed for analysis in a virtual 
environment.  
 
The privacy and confidentiality considerations hinge on whether it is acceptable for 
linked data to be exported or if they are required to remain within a specified setting. 
Where data are exported, control measures must be applied to mitigate re-
identification risk and to stipulate researcher behaviour by means of procedural 
controls and approvals. If data are held in a repository, then all necessary physical, 
technical and procedural measures must be in place to protect the data. Neither of 
these are trivial exercises and it is necessary to evaluate their implementation 
feasibility including factors such as compute capacity, technical expertise, engagement 
with other parties and costs/resource implications.  
 
Ultimately, there are decisions to be made on the many elements directly and indirectly 
involved in the process of data linkage whatever overall model is chosen. This will 
encapsulate what can be done, with which datasets, by whom and for which purposes. 
At all stages this must be carried out to ensure privacy and confidentiality, whilst 
simultaneously maximising data utility. This necessarily includes controls around the 
data as well as applied to the data. It is not something that can be fully captured in 
statistical coefficients, but relies on both quantitative and qualitative measures. 
 
Having considered these wider factors, we can now put the generic steps in the data 
linkage process (Section 3.1) into context, so that privacy and confidentiality are built 




                                                          
9 It is also possible to access distributed data held in separate repositories via a SRE. 







Figure 3: Generic steps in data linkage 
 
7. Recommendations and options 
Having drawn out these observations, we propose a high-level set of recommended 
questions to be considered in making decisions on options for data linkage, so that 




Guideline questions for data linkage 
L: Legislative position – Which are the key legislative instruments and lawful 
provisions for data processing, and what are the due diligence processes to be 
followed? 
I: Information systems – What is the status and readiness of data provider IT 
systems to supply data, and what additional demands are required to engage 
in data linkage? 
N: Nature of datasets – How do the datasets measure up in terms of data 
quality, completeness and update frequency? 
K: Knowledge-base – What level of expertise is held by data custodians and 
what would be the demand upon them to engage in data linkage?  
A: Aims and purposes – Allowing for flexibility, what are the main anticipated 
purposes for the linked data? 
G: Ground truth – Is there a gold standard reference dataset, or is possible to 
access ground truth via clerical review, for identity verification and matching? 
E: Environment – Which data management and access models are 
permissible and feasible considering the range of relevant factors?  
 
Generic stages: (i) pre-processing; (ii) 
indexing/blocking; (iii) record pair 
comparison; (iv) classification +/- clerical 
review; and (v) evaluation +/- clerical 
review. 
Authorisations and permissions for the use 
of data in identifiable form at any stage. 
Status of security protocols and data 
governance frameworks of all engaged 
parties, including data providers, TTPs, 
data linkage enterprises and linked dataset 
destinations. 
Physical, technical and procedural 
disclosure controls applied to the data and 
around the data. 
Quantitative (statistics-based) and 
qualitative (accreditation-based) measures 




The answers to these questions need to be taken into account when deciding on 
a data linkage approach. These feasibility and practicality issues are to be 
navigated in combination via an iterative process to assess their relative 
contributions to the overall model. The desired result should be an effective data 
linkage approach that sits within a robust data governance framework to ensure 
privacy and confidentiality. 
 
We expand on each of these questions to enable data linkage options to be 
considered.  
 
L: Legislative position – 
The first question concerns the pertaining legislative position and whether the PID 
component of the dataset can legally move from its source to be processed for data 
linkage. It is understood that for some government department datasets, PID are not 
permitted to move, and that in other cases, there is a position of risk aversion such that 
organisational policy makes data movement difficult. If there is no legal gateway, then 
it might be that the only feasible option is PPRL. But for all other cases, we would 
recommend that every effort is made to support data providers in their due diligence 
processes so that the PID can be moved to an appropriate agent for de-identification, 
matching and DRL/PRL. 
 
I: Information systems – 
The capacity of data provider information systems must be considered since the 
legislative position and due diligence will to a large extent determine the demand to be 
placed upon them. If only PPRL is allowed, then data provider systems will need to 
carry out pre-processing to prepare the data for hashing, and then apply the hash 
functions. This may create quite a demand on administrative information systems not 
designed with such processing in mind. The requirements upon data provider systems 
in engaging in PID-based record linkage are generally less onerous. 
 
N: Nature of datasets – 
Data quality, completeness and update frequency also need to influence the choice of 
linkage approach. Administrative data are subject to many inconsistencies, and these 
will affect data linkage efficacy unless the data can be pre-processed effectively, and 
preferably matched against a reliable reference dataset or subjected to clerical review. 
Again, this is far more straightforward to enact with PID-based than with PPRL 
methods, if sub-optimal results are to be avoided. 
 
K: Knowledge-base – 
Engaging in data linkage requires some action by data providers, whichever method is 
used. In the PID-based case studies (in Section 5), we showed that this can vary 
depending on the operating model in place. In most of the Australian models, data are 
called from providers by a data linkage unit by means of an index of links. PopData are 
authorised to hold the full identifiable datasets in their repository. SAIL operates a 
straightforward separation principle where data providers divide their datasets into two 
components, with the demographic data going to a TTP and the content data going 
directly to SAIL. Each of these methods is functioning and enabling data linkage to 
take place without over-burdening data providers. PPRL generally requires additional 
expertise and effort from data providers, unless personnel from the data receiving 




exists). But this, of course, raises privacy and confidentiality issues, since a third party 
would need a level of access to the PID in order to do this. 
 
A: Aims and purposes – 
The proposed uses of the data will play a part in the choice of data linkage method. 
This is partly to do with the trade-off between specificity and sensitivity, in terms of the 
relative importance of having a smaller set of highly-accurate linked data, or a larger 
set of data with possibly greater variability in match quality. This will depend on the 
types of decisions to be made from the linked data and the implications of inaccuracy 
vs missingness. In practical terms, data are unlikely to be destined for one narrow 
purpose, and so it is essential that data linkage is optimised to meet requirements. 
Again, this is less complex using PID-based methods than PPRL. Data quality is crucial 
as an ethical issue if reliable findings are to be produced for decision-making. 
 
G: Ground truth – 
Whether there is a reliable reference dataset or the availability to carry out clerical 
review for record matching will play an important part in the choice of data linkage 
method. These options are important to ensure data quality and maximise the rates of 
high quality linkage. There are privacy and confidentiality issues to take into account 
in terms of who is allowed to compare records to evaluate linkage steps. In some 
cases, such as the method used by NWIS (Section 5.4), the process is automated and 
not viewed by individuals, even though NWIS staff are authorised to view the PID as 
required. However, clerical review against ground truth is sometimes done manually 
using a sub-set of identifiable records, which means that appropriate authorisations 
must be in place for personnel carrying out the process. 
 
E: Environment – 
Linked data are managed and accessed under different operating models and data 
governance regimes. Which of those are permissible and feasible will depend on 
jurisdictional legislative and regulatory frameworks, but may also depend on 
organisational policies. Some data providers may or may not agree to linked data 
(incorporating their datasets) being released externally. Alternatively, this may be 
preferable, provided that all relevant approvals are in place in the absence of a suitable 
repository. As described in the case studies, Australian data linkage centres commonly 
follow the former model, whereas those of PopData BC and SAIL follow the latter. In 
each of these cases, data are prepared for researchers with limitations on successive 
linkage by curtailing the data and the use of project-specific linkage keys, with a 
requirement on researchers to behave with integrity. 
 
The principles, recommendations and options we draw from this article are highly 
relevant to the UK Government Statistical Service and resonate with those identified 
in the recent Office for Statistics Regulation report, namely: value, quality and 
trustworthiness. Many important societal questions cannot be answered without using 
linked data. A greater willingness to share and link data is essential to enable official 
statistics to add value by addressing society’s pressing questions. Data quality is 
paramount to avoid misleading information and ensure reliable conclusions to be 
drawn. Data custodians must demonstrate trustworthiness in safeguarding public data 
throughout data sharing and linkage processes [48]. 
 
In summary, taking into account the current state-of-play in the various record linkage 




possible, with an optimised combination of DRL and PRL, and to surround the data 
with privacy-by-design. This should be coupled with a clear awareness of the 
information needed at each step of the linkage pathway to improve the transparency, 
reproducibility, and accuracy of linkage processes, and ultimately the validity of data 
analyses and the interpretation of results [49]. It may well be the case that PPRL 
approaches will develop extensively in the near future to the point where they are as 
reliable as PID-based methods. But this does not depend only on advances in the 
approaches themselves, but on the accompanying factors required for their effective 
implementation, including the implications for data providers.  
 
We recommend effort being placed into working with data providers to draw their 
attention to the problems of pushing for anonymisation at source where there is no 
absence of a legal gateway for moving data. This could be framed in terms of the risks 
to data quality, the fact that PPRL does not eradicate disclosure risks, and the benefits 
of tried and tested PID-based linkage methods operating within a privacy-by-design 
framework.  
8. Conclusion 
This article has focused on privacy and confidentiality in data linkage. It set out the 
basic principles of linking data and the legislative context for data protection within the 
UK. From this, it outlined the main data linkage methods, with their practicalities and 
evaluation methods, and used case studies as illustrations of methods in practice. 
There is a range of inter-related factors that need to be taken into account in selecting 
a data linkage approach and we propose a set of high-level questions and options to 
aid this process. There are challenges to overcome to link and use administrative data 
lawfully, safely and in line with social-acceptability. It is simply not enough to rely on 
lawful provision, since legality is not the same as social licence, and due public 
engagement is essential [50]. Consequently, it’s easy to find reasons for not using 
data, but the status quo is a dangerous position.  
 
As well as the paramount importance of using data safely and effectively for public 
benefit, an international case study has demonstrated the serious harms to individuals 
and society when data are not used, i.e. the non-use of data. Taken globally, this 
phenomenon results in the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and $billions in 
societal financial burdens [51]. We recommend a clear recognition of the limitations 
and risks in relying solely on control measures applied to data. There is a real need to 
surround data in a robust, proportionate, privacy-by-design data governance model, to 
maintain and maximise data utility and simultaneously protect privacy and 
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